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The Unusual Dynamic of the Eichmann Trial:
Prosecution and Defense Versus the Court
FRANK TUERKHEIMER*
The Eichmann trial stands as a milestone both in the history of the
Holocaust and in law.1 The law part is easy. The trial brought to justice
a principal operator in the most pernicious conspiracy in history: the
conspiracy to murder eleven million Jews.2 It is a given that the most
severe sanction the law can impose in a civilized system is a quickly
administered death penalty.3 Eichmann’s conviction and execution
meant the law succeeded in arriving at a just result. Historically, the
trial was significant because it humanized the Holocaust and, through
the new medium of television, brought that human element to the
world.4
The ability of the prosecution to educate the public at large about
the Holocaust, as opposed to more narrowly confining itself to what
Eichmann did and said, rested on both the determination to do so, and
the unusual dynamic of the trial and its tensions. Perhaps the best way
to articulate these tensions is to look at the three fundamental players in
a criminal trial: the court, the prosecution, and the defense. What is truly
unusual about the Eichmann trial is that in broad terms, the prosecution
and defense were aligned while the court tangled with the two, mainly
* Frank Tuerkheimer is Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin Law School.
1. DANIEL LEVY & NATAN SZNAIDER, THE HOLOCAUST AND MEMORY IN THE GLOBAL
AGE 105 (Assenka Oksiloff trans., 2006).
2. The Wannsee Protocol and a 1994 Report on Auschwitz by the Office of Strategic
Services, in 11 THE HOLOCAUST: SELECTED DOCUMENTS IN EIGHTEEN VOLUMES (John
Mendelsohn ed., 2010) [hereinafter The Wannsee Protocol].
3. Richard Lowell Nygaard, On Death as Punishment, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 825, 826
(1996).
4. Sara J. Bloomfield, Op-Ed: From the Nuremberg and Eichmann Trials, a Challenge for
Today, JTA: THE GLOBAL NEWS SERVICE OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE (May 1, 2011),
http://www.jta.org/news/article/2011/05/01/3087351/op-ed-from-the-nuremberg-and-eichmanntrials-a-challenge-for-today (explaining that the fifteen-year gap between the major Nuremberg
trial of 1945–46, and the Eichmann trial in 1961, saw the enormous spread of television in the
communications media. The world learned about Nuremberg largely through newspapers;
television brought the Eichmann trial to millions of homes).
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the prosecution. In a nutshell, the prosecution wished to present as much
of a picture of the Holocaust as could be legitimately based on the
charges brought, and it was the court, rather than Eichmann, who stood
in the way.
For starters, the prosecution had enormous latitude since the
conspiracy, of which Eichmann was charged with being part, was itself
of historical dimensions.5 The general rule is that in conspiracy trials,
the prosecution is not limited to proving only what a particular
defendant did, but whatever was done in furtherance of the conspiracy.6
For example, in a prosecution against the kingpin of a massive drug
importation conspiracy, most of the trial will be consumed with proof of
what lower level operatives did, persons totally unknown to those
masterminding the operation. Indeed, a standard jury instruction on
conspiracy is that a particular defendant need not know all the members
of the conspiracy; all that matters is that they act in concert to effect a
larger criminal purpose.7
Thus, it was perfectly consistent with the rules governing
conspiracy trials for the prosecution in the Eichmann case to place into
evidence the killings conducted by the Einsatzgruppen, roving SS bands
that followed the German army eastward across western Russia after the
phenomenal success with which the Germans invaded the Soviet
Union.8 That success, coupled with earlier military victories, placed the
vast majority of Europe’s Jews under German control and permitted the
realization of Hitler’s earlier prophecy that another World War would
mark the annihilation of European Jewry.9 That Eichmann did not pull
the trigger on one of the 1–1.5 million Jews killed by the
Einsatzgruppen mattered not a bit. While they were doing their part, he
was doing his—a conventional division of responsibility in any
conspiracy.10
5. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN: RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS IN
DISTRICT COURT OF JERUSALEM, ISRAEL 3 (1992) (although the word “conspiracy” did not
appear in the charge, the allegation was that Eichmann acted in concert with others; for example,
the first count of the indictment alleged that Eichmann, “together with others” caused the deaths
of millions of Jews) [hereinafter Eichmann Trial Record].
6. See, e.g., 5 LEONARD B. SAND, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 19–51 (2011)
(providing the necessary element of commission of an overt act to prove a charge of conspiracy in
the United States).
7. See, e.g., id. at 19–31 (providing the necessary element of knowing, willing, and
voluntary membership to prove a charge of conspiracy in the United States).
8. Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 3.
9. Hitler’s actual term, the German: “Vernichtung.”
10. See, e.g., SAND, supra note 6, at 19–32.
THE
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How did this bring about the unusual alignment of prosecution and
defense on one side and the court on the other? The court, sitting
without a jury, was interested in Eichmann; it needed no instructions on
the Holocaust.11 Aside from what they knew as educated persons, each
of the three judges had left Germany for Palestine in the 1930s and it
would be unusual if none of their extended families had emerged
unscathed from the Holocaust. The prosecution’s effort to paint a
broader picture was, from their perspective, unnecessary and
unhelpful.12 The defense did not object to this “larger picture” approach
that characterized what the prosecution did because it found it
advantageous for the record to be saturated with facts having no
connection to Eichmann at all. For example, when the prosecution
offered into evidence the “diary” of Hans Frank, the German GovernorGeneral of a major chunk of Poland during the war, there was no
objection from the defense.13 This diary consisted of memoranda,
speeches, and a rather complete history of Frank’s brutal administration
in Poland, which Frank preserved, perhaps because he thought that his
conflicts with the SS, fully documented in the diary, might be
exculpatory.14
That this was not so was Frank’s misfortune at the first Nuremberg
trial where the details of the diary turned out to be dynamite evidence
for the prosecution’s case.15 At Eichmann’s trial, a small part of the
diary was read into evidence, specifically documents showing that
Frank complained that it would be impossible to rid Europe of Jewry in
a short time since Jews had been around for five thousand years.16
Eichmann’s lawyer, Robert Servatius, who knew the diary well from his
work as defense counsel at the first Nuremberg trial, did not object to its
admission or this reading from it and on cross-examination of the
witness, through whom it was put into evidence, asked only one
question: Was the name of Adolph Eichmann mentioned in any of these
twenty-nine volumes?17 The answer was that there was no mention of

11. Gary
Grobman,
Eichmann:
Trial
Info,
PBS
ONLINE
http://remember.org/eichmann/study4.htm.
12. See, e.g., Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 397–98.
13. Id. at 392.
14. Id.
15. Hans Frank, HOLOCAUST EDUC. & ARCHIVE RES. TEAM
http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/ar/frank.html.
16. Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 395.
17. Id. at 396.

(1997),

(2007),
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Eichmann.18 The prosecution was thus satisfied: a major component of
Holocaust history was now in evidence; Eichmann was satisfied: among
the hundreds of thousands of words proving this Holocaust component,
his name did not appear, thereby arguably minimizing his role. The
court was burdened with a record that was of no help.
The question of Jewish resistance raised comparable issues. How,
conceivably, could the resistance of Jews be part of the conspiracy?
Thus, when the prosecution indicated it was calling a witness to testify
as to the Warsaw Ghetto revolt, it described the proposed testimony as
part of “the general picture.”19 At that point the court stated:
This is a very delicate matter, Mr. Hausner. I know that. But I do not
have to tell you we are not presenting a general picture here. If the
picture is portrayed incidentally in the course of the trial – well and
good; but we have an indictment and this indictment constitutes a
20
framework for the trial.

The prosecution then proceeded, completely oblivious to the
court’s expressed desire to contain such general picture evidence. There
is more than posturing to the prosecution’s position. The first count of
the charge against Eichmann accused him of violating Israeli law by,
together with others, causing the deaths of millions of Jews by
implementing a plan, which was called The Final Solution to the Jewish
Question.21 There can be no doubt that the evidence showed Eichmann’s
awareness of the breadth of the conspiracy. His undisputed involvement
at the Wansee Conference, where the object of killing eleven million
Jews was brought to the attention of the major bureaucratic entities of
the Third Reich, amply demonstrated his awareness.22
Other subtle details demonstrated such awareness as well. The
court received into evidence the statement of Dieter Wisliceny, an
Eichmann subordinate.23 At his trial in Czechoslovakia, Wisliceny
testified that Eichmann told him, “Himmler has received orders from
Hitler for the complete biological extermination of European Jewry.”24
In response to the court’s concern that a general picture was to be
avoided, the prosecution’s answer was simple: Jews killed while
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 397–98.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 1420–26.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 884.
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resisting were no less victims of the Holocaust than those killed without
resistance. To prove that they were killed required placing into evidence
the context of their killing which, it turned out, was in the context of
resistance. It is one thing for the court to say that such evidence was not
helpful in assessing Eichmann’s guilt or innocence. It is another,
however, to say that the evidence is not admissible.
Evidence of Jewish resistance tended to precipitate the collision
between the court and the prosecution. During the testimony of Abba
Kovner, a Lithuanian resistance fighter who testified about resistance
efforts both in the Vilna ghetto and in the Lithuanian countryside, the
prosecution asked the court for “patience” as it approached what the
prosecution deemed a very important subject.25 The court responded: “I
do not believe that you can complain of a lack of patience on the part of
the court.”26 Kovner, in extraordinarily dramatic testimony, went on to
disparage the question as to why there was not more resistance, stating
that the question should be how come there was resistance at all.27 At
the end of this dramatic testimony, the following colloquy between the
court and prosecution took place:
Presiding Judge: Thank you very much, Mr. Kovner. Mr. Hausner,
we have heard shocking things here, in the language of a poet, but I
maintain that in many parts of this evidence we have strayed far from
the subject of this trial. There is no possibility at all of interrupting
evidence such as this, while it is being rendered, out of respect for
the witness and out of respect for the matters he is relating. It is your
task to prepare the witness, to explain matters to him, and to
eliminate everything that is not relevant to the trial, so as not to place
the Court once again – and this is not the first time – in such a
situation. I regret that I have to make these remarks, after the
conclusion of evidence such as this.
Attorney General: Your Honours, perhaps when my turn comes for a
final summation of my arguments, it will become clear to the Court
that these things are not of such a nature.
Presiding Judge: This was not the first time that I have mentioned
this. The Court has a certain view of this trial according to the
indictment, and we have stated this more than once – sometimes in a
hint, sometimes more clearly, and the Prosecution must direct itself
in accordance of what it hears from the Court.
Attorney General: This we do, undoubtedly.
25. Id. at 461.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 461–66.

406

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 34:401

Presiding Judge: Yet, nevertheless, I do not see that these matters
have penetrated to the extent that they should penetrate.
Attorney General: Perhaps this is so, because Your Honours are not
yet aware of everything which we still intend to bring before you.
Presiding Judge: We heard your opening address which, it seems to
me, lays down the general lines of what you wish to place before the
28
Court.

Proof on the lack of resistance was, in fact, within the scope of the
charge. Why were so many of the prosecution witnesses asked why they
did not resist—questions that generated Kovner’s criticism of the
prosecution in which others joined? The answer is simple: the
conspiracy was designed to deceive its victims, to weaken them, and to
leave them in no position to resist. For example, most of Warsaw’s Jews
were taken by train to Treblinka where only those assisting in the
looting and killing process were spared—and usually just temporarily.
The distance between Warsaw and Treblinka—about 65 miles—would
ordinarily take two to three hours by train; it often took two to three
days or longer.29 Why? To weaken, debilitate and demoralize those
inside so that upon arrival at Treblinka their trip to the gas chambers
would proceed smoothly. This too was part of the plan (conspiracy).
Every conspiracy contains components designed to insure its
effectiveness. This one was no different. Here, however, Eichmann’s
involvement was more than just through the conduct of others; he was
directly implicated.30
Eichmann coordinated the train schedules.31 The evidence,
however, proved even more damning. When he arranged for the
deportation of Jews from Hungary, he arranged for them to send post
cards to their remaining relatives, post cards that said they should hurry
and join them before all the good places were taken.32 Perhaps still more
perniciously, he had the deportees urge their relatives to bring good
hiking boots, suggesting bucolic strolls in the rustic surroundings of

28. Id. at 466.
29. YITZHAK ARAD, BELZEC, SOBIBOR, TREBLINKA: THE OPERATION REINHARD DEATH
CAMPS 66 (1987).
30. Doron Geller, The Capture of Adolf Eichmann, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR.,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/eichcap.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2012).
31. See Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 577–78, 592–96 (evidencing Eichmann’s
involvement in scheduling trains for deportation from France, especially with respect to Jewish
children).
32. See id. at 944.
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their destination.33 The duplicity of imagined country walks to facilitate
further deportations was also to obtain the best possible foot-ware for
the German military upon the murder of the deportees.34
There is no question that the prosecution won this regular battle
with the court. It was difficult for the court to cut off witnesses when the
defense did not object. As a consequence, considerable evidence not
having Eichmann’s fingerprints on it saturates the record of the trial.
This may have contributed to a massive misinterpretation of the trial
and Eichmann’s role in the Holocaust. All of this began with a series in
the New Yorker magazine.
Within two years of the trial, a series of essays on the trial
appeared in the New Yorker written by Hannah Arendt.35 By most
objective standards, Arendt is one of the great intellects of midtwentieth century thought. Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism
remains one of the most incisive dissections of the modern totalitarian
state, distinguishing it from the despotisms of an earlier day. Thus, it
should not be surprising that an entire generation of interested persons,
including me, derived their understanding of the Eichmann trial from
her articles which later appeared in book form, in two sequential
editions.36 What are Arendt’s observations that pointed a reader of her
description of the trial in the wrong direction?
Although, this is not the occasion to engage in an extended review
of Arendt’s book, a brief discussion is appropriate.37 Arendt claimed
that the prosecution, to add stature to its case, puffed up Eichmann’s
role in the Holocaust beyond what it actually was, thereby enhancing
the importance of its case and downplaying the role of other
perpetrators.38 She saw Eichmann not as a pivotal person in the
implementation of the Final Solution but rather as a dull bureaucrat who
33. Gabriel Bach, The Eichmann Trial, 34 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 315, 327
(2012).
34. Interview by Frank Tuerkheimer with Justice Gabriel Bach, Senior Prosecutor in the
Adolf
Eichmann
Trial,
in
Jerusalem,
Israel
(Nov.
2006),
available
at
http://www.eichmannprosecutorinterview.org.
35. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, NEW YORKER, Feb. 16, 1963, at 40.
36. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
(1963).
37. One of the Israeli prosecutors at the trial was a historian, and he subsequently wrote
about Arendt’s take on the trial. JACOB ROBINSON, AND THE CROOKED SHALL BE MADE
STRAIGHT: THE EICHMANN TRIAL, THE JEWISH CATASTROPHE, AND HANNAH ARENDT’S
NARRATIVE (1965).
38. Amos Elon, Introduction, in EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY
OF EVIL xiv, xiv (2006).
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simply did what he was told and tried to do it well. Her view of
Eichmann is perhaps best summarized in her own statement that
Eichmann was more clown than monster.39
My own recent interest in the trial derived from a presentation
given by Chief Justice Gabriel Bach in New York City almost ten years
ago. Justice Bach, a senior prosecutor in the case, spoke about the trial
and mentioned the story of Jenny Cozzi, the Jewish widow of a
Christian Italian Army officer. Cozzi was detained in Riga, Latvia, and
the Italian Government, then an ally of Germany in the war, asked that
in honor and in the memory of her deceased husband, she not be
deported but be permitted to return to Italy.40 This request crossed
Eichmann’s desk and he decided against sparing Cozzi, notwithstanding
the request from the Italian Foreign Office.41 In the end she was
deported to a concentration camp and became one of the Holocaust’s
victims.42
The Eichmann depicted in this brief but telling anecdote was not
the dull, mechanized bureaucrat that Arendt depicted. Rather, it revealed
an activist in the plan to murder Jews, dedicated enough to take on an
ally of Germany in the war to insure that still one more Jew was added
to the list of those to be killed. The transcript of the trial reveals that the
Cozzi incident was one of many in which Eichmann’s ardor and
initiative in killing Jews stands out, which either eluded Arendt, or
which she simply ignored.43
Before turning to these other examples of Eichmann’s key role in
the Holocaust, it is important to see where Eichmann stood in the Nazi
bureaucracy with respect to the Holocaust. Hitler, of course, was at the
apex of the conspiracy followed immediately by his number two person,
Hermann Goering.44 Unquestionably acting pursuant to Hitler’s wishes,
on July 31, 1941, when it was clear that the invasion of the Soviet
Union was proceeding well, and the vast majority of European Jewry
was now or was soon to be under German control, Goering, in a written
memorandum addressed to Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Main
Security Office of the Reich (RSHA) advised Heydrich that the RSHA
39. ARENDT, supra note 36, at 54.
40. Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 525.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 518–27; see generally ARENDT, supra note 36 (omitting any mention of the
Cozzi incident or any similar incidents).
44. Richard W. Sonnenfeldt, Remarks, The Nuremberg Trials and the Occupation of
Germany , 27 CARDOZO L. R. 1609, 1611–12 (2006).
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would be responsible for implementing the Final Solution to the Jewish
Question.45 Heydrich’s subordinate in the RSHA was SS Lieutenant
General Heinrich Mueller and Eichmann was, on paper, subordinate to
Mueller.46 (Heydrich was assassinated in Czechoslovakia in 1942 and
replaced by Eichmann’s friend, Ernst Kaltenbrunner)47 One way to look
at Eichmann is to say that he was low in the bureaucratic process;
another is to observe that as one worked one’s way down the Nazi
bureaucracy, Eichmann was the first person whose sole responsibility
lay with implementing the killing of Jews. All those above him had
other responsibilities; he did not.
Eichmann carried out that responsibility with great thoroughness.48
When a request was made to spare a Jewish scientist with a specialty in
electronics because of his potential value to the German military,
Eichmann noted that his invention had already been filed with the
Patent Office and he should be treated like everyone else.49 The file
notes that the scientist was deported on the next transport.50
When Marshal Petain, head of the Vichy Government in France, a
government openly committed to collaboration with Germany,51 asked
that a French Jew named Roger Masse be spared, he fared no better.
Masse was a member of the Legion d’Honneur and had been awarded
France’s highest military honor, the Croix de Guerre. Eichmann turned
Petain down, stating, “As a matter of principle I cannot agree to his
being returned. Please Note. By order – Eichmann.”52
When it was pointed out to Eichmann that a Swiss Jew named
Michaelis was married to a Christian woman whose father was
prominent in Switzerland and inclined to Germany, and that his
deportation could lead to adverse consequences for Germany in

45. “Final
Solution,”
U.S.
HOLOCAUST
MEM’L
MUSEUM,
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007328 (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
46. S.S. and Other Nazi Leaders, HOLOCAUST EDUC. & ARCHIVE RES. TEAM (2007),
http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/holoprelude/ssleaders.html.
47. Id.
48. Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 1836. One of Eichmann’s own witnesses said
of Eichmann: “[W]hen in doubt, Eichmann always acted in accordance with Party doctrine in its
most extreme interpretation.” Id.
49. Id. at 602.
50. Id.
VIRTUAL
LIBR.
(2013),
51. The
Vichy
Regime,
JEWISH
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/VichyRegime.html (explaining the Prime
Minister of the Vichy regime, Pierre Laval, had openly declared that he wished for a German
victory in the war).
52. Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 596.
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Switzerland, Eichmann refused to permit Michaelis to return to
Switzerland. Eichmann states, “For reasons of principle, I am unable to
permit [Michaelis to return to Switzerland].”53
When Eichmann learned that virtually all of Danish Jewry had
avoided apprehension and that the SS in Denmark refused to knock
down the doors to Jewish homes when no one answered, he registered a
virulent complaint with the German Foreign office; he similarly
expressed his unhappiness over the escape of half of Norway’s Jews to
Sweden.54 But nowhere is Eichmann’s commitment to the cause of
Jewish annihilation more evident than the events in Hungary.
The fate of Hungarian Jewry is nothing less than a tragedy
imposed on a tragedy. Hungary was an ally of Germany and so,
administratively, under control of the Hungarians.55 As a consequence,
from the outbreak of the war in 1939 until early 1944, no organized
effort had been made to murder Hungary’s Jews.56 By the spring of
1944, the handwriting on the wall unmistakably pointed to a pending
German defeat. The Battle of Stalingrad, at which three hundred
thousand German soldiers were taken prisoner and which reversed the
direction of troop movement from Germany’s advance eastward to a
Soviet advance westward, had taken place fifteen months earlier.57 By
early 1944, The Red Army had driven the Germans out of most of the
Soviet Union and was marching westward across Eastern Europe
toward Germany itself.58 The Allies had defeated the Germans in North
Africa, Italy had collapsed, and the German Army in Italy was
retreating northwards.59 On the western front, the Allied invasion of
Normandy was imminent, portending an eastward advance toward
Germany.60 Further, bombers based in England were regularly pounding
Germany, impairing, but not eliminating, the industrial base that

53. Id. at 631.
54. Id. at 643–50.
55. RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 546 (1985); see also
Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 928.
56. See Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 928; HILBERG, supra note 55, at 796.
57. See generally On this Day – 1943: Germans Surrender at Stalingrad, BBC (2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/2/newsid_3573000/3573003.stm (for a
summary of the Battle of Stalingrad).
58. Alan Taylor, World War II: The Fall of Nazi Germany, ATLANTIC pt. 17 (Oct. 9, 2011)
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/infocus/2011/10/world-war-ii-the-fall-of-nazigermany/100166/#.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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underlay Germany’s war effort. It was at this point that Eichmann was
sent to Budapest to dispose of Hungary’s 750,000 Jews.61
And dispose he did. In a matter of months, half of Hungary’s Jews
were sent to Auschwitz where almost all were killed. When it was
questionable whether the crematoria at Auschwitz could handle the new
load, Eichmann visited Auschwitz and saw to it that twelve thousand
bodies could be cremated in a day as opposed to ten thousand, which
had been the prior maximum.62 Eichmann was as motivated to get Jews
to Auschwitz as he was to the disposal of their murdered bodies. At a
later point in the deportation process the Regent of Hungary directed
that trains to Auschwitz be stopped and that an existing train laden with
Jews for killing be turned around.63 When it returned to the transition
camp, Eichmann had the Jews placed on trucks and taken to
Auschwitz.64 In that manner he circumvented the directive of the
Hungarian Regent designed to end deportations.65
Indeed, when Himmler himself, in the fall of 1944, directed that
gassings at Auschwitz stop—not out of a newly found sympathy for
Jews, but simply because he knew that Germany’s time was running
out—Eichmann arranged for a march for tens of thousands of Jews to
the Austrian border under brutally cold November-December
conditions, resulting in thousands of deaths along the way.66 Himmler
himself reprimanded Eichmann for this march.67 At that point, the
advancing Soviet army brought an end to the carnage.
In the end, however, nothing better illustrates Eichmann’s strident
devotion to the killing of every last Jew than evidence which the
prosecution called “the gravest we are able to submit against the
accused”—his successful effort to override Hitler himself.68
To obtain the assent of the Hungarian Regent to the deportation of
Hungarian Jews in general, Hitler had agreed with the Regent that
eighty-seven hundred Jewish families could be saved, be given transit
visas to Switzerland and then be permitted to go to Palestine.69 This

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

HILBERG, supra note 55, at 796, 823.
See Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 943.
Id. at 731.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 732, 1785–90.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 108 (referring to the Veesenmeyer telegram).
Id. at 1087–88.
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numbered about forty thousand Jews.70 When Eichmann became aware
of this understanding between Hitler and the Hungarian Regent, he
immediately tried to undermine it. All of this was reported in a
telegram that the German Ambassador to Hungary, Edmund
Veesenmeyer, sent to Berlin.71 He wrote that about forty thousand
“souls” and one thousand children were to be given visas for
Switzerland.72 He then notes that Eichmann does not agree to their
transit to Switzerland and “under any circumstances to the emigration of
Hungarian Jews to Palestine. The Jews who are under consideration
constitute, without exception, valuable human material from a
biological point of view.”73 Veesenmayer notes that Eichmann asked for
reconsideration of the decision to let the Jews reach Switzerland and
then Palestine. Eichmann also asked that if such reconsideration were
not granted, additional deportations from Budapest should be arranged
quickly and prior to the arrival of visas to Switzerland.74 Eichmann
succeeded; Hitler’s agreement with the Regent was never implemented:
the Jews were not saved.75
Not one person can be directly responsible for killing six million
people. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to identify the primary
culprit. Hitler directed that European Jewry be annihilated; Himmler
and Goering implemented his direction by in turn directing subordinates
to do so, and those subordinates furthered the process, either by
themselves or through others.76 Clearly principal responsibility lies with
those at the upper levels of this hierarchy. But at some point there was
need for a “hands-on” director, someone whose full attention was
devoted to insuring the implementation of the killing process. No one fit
this description better than Eichmann.
The prosecution, without defense opposition, was able to prove
almost the entirety of its case. Perhaps Arendt was too influenced by the
Eichmann in the dock—or in the glass booth in this case—and thus saw
more clown than monster. The trial, however, was not about the
captured Eichmann of 1961 forced to confront his words and his deeds.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1087.
72. VEESENMAYER TELEGRAM [VEESENMAYER CABLE] (Jul. 25, 1944) (Ger.) (on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review).
73. See Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 1088.
74. Id.
75. Id.
HOLOCAUST
MEM’L
MUSEUM,
76. “Final
Solution”:
Overview,
U.S.
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005151 (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
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It was about the Eichmann of 1941–1945 who was not forced to
confront anything. Instead he implemented, with relish, determination,
and frightening thoroughness, Hitler’s plan for the annihilation of
European Jewry. There was nothing “clownish” about that Eichmann
and certainly a great deal of “monster.”77
Finally, a word on the fairness of the trial. Arendt, who
acknowledged that Israel was the correct place to try Eichmann, makes
the point that defense witnesses were excluded since, had they come to
Israel, they would have been exposed to prosecution under the same law
under which Eichmann was prosecuted.78 The prosecution explicitly
failed to promise such witnesses immunity. She suggests that the
prosecution’s refusal to immunize Eichmann’s defense witnesses was
unfair to Eichmann.79 On closer analysis, it is clear that the Israeli
prosecutors did far more than is conventionally done to accommodate a
criminal defendant.
First, perhaps Arendt was not aware that the scenario she describes
is common in criminal practice. While the prosecution has the power to
confer immunity on witnesses, the defense does not. Consequently, it is
not unusual for the defense to be impaired in calling witnesses. Such
potential witnesses refuse to testify because they fear that if they testify
and acknowledge facts that might be incriminating their testimony will
be used against them in a subsequent prosecution. To single out Israel
for following a practice standard in the Anglo-American legal system is
unwarranted.
Second, Israel went out of its way to accommodate the defense.
Ordinarily, once the prosecution refuses to immunize potential defense
witnesses, the matter is over. It was not over in Eichmann’s case. Rather
than just refusing immunity to any of Eichmann’s potential witnesses,
the prosecution assented to their deposition in German courts,
depositions that were evidentiary and could then be used at the trial in
77. Arendt also questions the prosecution’s effort to hold Eichmann responsible for the
“crimes in the east,” observing that his principal responsibilities were in Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Austria, and later Hungary. ARENDT, supra note 36, at 212–19. The problem is
that she approaches the trial as an exposition under the rules governing a historian writing history.
These are not, however, the rules of the trial where the broader concept of agency, triggered by
the charges of collective action, govern. Furthermore, Arendt is simply wrong on the facts.
Rudolph Hoss, commandant of Auschwitz from 1940 until late 1943, both in his trial and at the
main trial at Nuremberg, testified how Eichmann, pursuant to the instructions of Heinrich
Himmler, head of the SS, was instrumental in the running of the Auschwitz death camp. See also
Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 256–57.
78. ARENDT, supra note 36, at 220–21.
79. Id.

414

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 34:401

Jerusalem.80 Numerous depositions were taken in Germany; someone
from the prosecution staff attended and Dieter Wechtenbruch, a Munich
attorney and assistant to Servatius, appeared on behalf of Eichmann.81
This accommodation is far more than the general prosecutorial inaction
when confronted with defense claims that its witnesses refuse to testify
for the defense out of fear of prosecution.
There is an even more fundamental flaw in the notion that the
Israeli prosecutor’s refusal to grant defense witness immunity was
causal in impairing Eichmann’s defense. As has been noted, several
depositions were taken in German courts. Had a defense witness
testified to facts in Germany implicating him or her in the Holocaust,
what was to stop Israel from charging that person and asking for his or
her extradition? Or what was to stop the German government from
using the information provided in the deposition as the basis for a
prosecution under German law? A large number of Germans were
prosecuted in Germany before and after the Eichmann trial for crimes
relating to the Holocaust.82 Thus, anyone testifying to incriminating
facts in the depositions faced exactly the same risk as he or she would
have faced if the testimony were provided in Israel itself.
Lastly, there is a larger irony in this unfair criticism of the
prosecution. The depositions that were taken in Germany contained a
great deal of information helpful to the prosecution and inconsistent
with the notion that Eichmann’s role was as minimal as he said, and as
Arendt believed. For example, Eichmann wanted to call Dr. Franz Six.
Six occupied numerous positions in the Nazi hierarchy, perhaps the
most notorious as a commander in the infamous Einsatzgruppen.83 He
had been convicted in the Einsatzgruppen trial in 1948 and was
sentenced to twenty years in prison.84 The sentence was subsequently
reduced and he was released in the early 1950s.85 Six, designated as a
defense witness by Eichmann, had the following to say when questioned
in Germany:
80. See, e.g., Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 1906–08 (transcript of Hans Jüttner’s
deposition in Germany submitted as part of the official trial transcript in Israel).
81. See id. at 1906 (showing Dieter Wechtenbruch as “present” at the deposition).
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Had I wished to obtain an exemption . . . for a Jew, I would not have
gone to Eichmann, as he was an exponent for the other side.
....
I believed that, when in doubt, Eichmann always acted in accordance
with Party doctrine in its most extreme form.

Six went on to confirm that it was possible to be transferred to other
operations in the war; Six had been transferred.86 Finally, and most
importantly, Six perceived that Eichmann had “wider powers than other
Section Heads” and there was a “general impression” that “Eichmann
was not only under Mueller’s orders, but that he was somewhat on the
same level as Mueller.”87
The Eichmann trial stands out as a commitment to justice and a
service to history. It dealt fairly with Eichmann, and contributed
enormously to an exposure of the Holocaust and to its horrors. Much
has been done in the period since the trial to institutionalize a response
to genocide. That genocide continues cannot be laid at the doorstep of
those involved in the Eichmann case. They did their part.

86. Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 1836. Eichmann had testified he tried to obtain
a transfer but that was impossible.
87. Id.

